Africa should be in control of endangered species laws
Economics of trade if Africa regulates its endangered species
There has been mounting apprehension universally that trade in endangered species should be measured, over the last 30 years. Trade in wildlife is big business projected to be worth billions of dollars per annum. As wildlife and wildlife products cross borders, international cooperation and extra efforts are necessary to control this business and protect these species from over exploitation and to ensure their long-term survival. According to trade and endangered species (2014), delegates from 80 countries met in Washington to draw up a plan for trade control and licenses, in 1973. The resolution on international trade in endangered species CITES, was formed as a result of this meeting. When a nation joins CITES, laws to prohibit trade in live or dead specimens of wildlife should be passed by its government (trade and endangered species, 2014).
CITES has adopted innovative trade measures to ease prudently controlled trade to provide an incentive, for the sustained conservation of that trade. These innovative measures implemented show that the convention is developing, to meet new tasks related with the regulation of international wildlife trade, and is adopting practical new mechanisms to attain its objectives.
African nations have an interest in preserving elephants because of international demand for ivory. The laws have contributed largely to the continent’s sustainable development and have enriched the people. This market theory has been adopted by several nations from southern Africa, such as Namibia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa. In these countries, elephants are protected by letting the villagers to manage the populations of the elephants, and excerpt a sustainable harvest from the herds giving them income from the ivory sale and hunting rights. Through this approach, elephants continued survival is guaranteed, by providing the villagers with a vested interest in their preservation (protecting endangered species, 2002:26).
The South African governments, Namibia and Zimbabwe expressed dissatisfaction with the international ban on trade performance in rhino horn. The governments resolved that a legal trade that is measured in rhino horn might be a better option. This failed to stop poaching however. There was evidence of rising rhino horn prices in the consumer markets, which may in turn have enthused poaching in range states where rhinos were inefficiently protected, and where the enticement structures favored poachers rather than conservationists. Nonetheless, a number of masked complexities need to be addressed in assessing the ostensible catastrophe of the convention with the rhinoceros family (trade measures in cites, 2000:49).
However, there are a variety of challenges faced by African nations such as lack of financial resources, to assist the concerned parties to improve acquiescence and its failure to provide inclusive framework, which gives financial incentives to parties. Moreover, African countries are scarcely able to meet payment of salary and wages. (Werksman, Cameron & Roderick, 2014).
In addition, as the population of human in Africa continues to grow, wildlife conflicts and land competition will also increase, such that greater ideas and prospective costs will be required to preserve the wildlife land (trade measures in CITES, 2000:38).
There is also a dramatic increase in poaching of elephants in Africa as a result of illegal ivory trade threatening their existence. If African countries significantly restrict illegal ivory trade to the United States, poaching cases will reduce.
Protecting endangered species.2002.
Trade and Endangered Species: Wildlife and the law. 2014. Accessed at<https://ypte.org.uk/factsheets/trade-and-endangered-species/wildlife-and-the-law>
Trade measures in CITES. IUCN Report (09/11/00) – 49.2000
Werksman, J, Cameron, J & Roderick, P. Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law.2014